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The Barnett formula under the Smith Reforms 
 
Jim Cuthbert 
 
Abstract:   
 
With the implementation of the Smith Commission reforms, there will be abatements to the Scottish 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V EORFN JUDQW DV FDOFXODWHG E\ WKH %DUQHWW IRUPXOD, to allow for the tax revenues which 
Westminster will forego.  The income tax abatement will be increased through time in an arrangement 
known as Holtham indexation.  The purpose of this paper is to model these new fiscal arrangements. 
The modelling implies that, other than in an unlikely special case, the system cannot run on indefinitely 
with fixed parameter values, without reaching relative values of per capita public expenditure in Scotland 
and England which would be politically unacceptable.  Moreover, there is a likelihood of adverse 
dynamic effects which would further destabilise the system.  The paper also puts forward an adjustment 
to the original form of Holtham indexation, to take account of relative population growth. While not 
answering every problem, this adjustment has strong equity arguments in its favour, and would also 
significantly stabilise the system.  It is particularly important that the implications of this type of modelling 
should be taken on board by policy makers and parliamentarians just now, when the detailed legislative 
and other arrangements for implementing the Smith reforms are about to be finalised. 
 
I Introduction 
 
An earlier paper in the Fraser of Allander Commentary, (Cuthbert, 2001), modelled the way in which 
relative population change between England and Scotland interacted with the Barnett formula. It was 
shown there how relative population growth in England compared to Scotland could have a very marked 
effect on the limiting ratio of per capita public expenditure between England and Scotland, and on the 
trajectory towards that limit. 
 
This paper extends the modelling in that earlier paper, to incorporate the effects of the proposed method 
of indexation, (Holtham indexation), of the abatement to the Barnett block grant which will come into 
effect as the Smith Commission reforms are implemented. It turns out that both relative population 
growth, and the relative rate of growth in the relevant tax base between England and Scotland, will play 
an important part in determining the behaviour of the Barnett formula as modified by the Smith 
Commission proposals. In particular, the modelling indicates the potential for the emergence of dynamic 
effects, in which relative population growth could interact with growth in the tax base, in a way which 
could adversely affect Scotland. 
 
The paper also puts forward a suggested modification of Holtham indexation: not only is there a strong 
equity argument for this modification, but it would also correct some of the worst effects of unadjusted 
Holtham indexation. 
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II Background (1): The Smith Commission proposals on tax, and Holtham indexation 
 
The Smith Commission reported on 24 November 2014, (Smith Commission, 2014), and on 21 January 
2015 the then coalition government put forward its proposals for implementation in ³6FRWODQGLQWKH
8QLWHG.LQJGRP$Q(QGXULQJ6HWWOHPHQW´Cm8990).This paper is concerned with the Smith proposals 
relating to tax. What is proposed in the light of Cm8990 is that Scotland would be given control of certain 
taxes - principally non-savings, non-dividend income tax, together with air passenger duty, and the 
aggregates levy: and that the Scottish government would receive the revenues from these taxes. In 
addition, while Scotland would have no control over the rates of VAT, about half of the VAT revenues 
attributed to Scotland would be assigned to the Scottish government. In total, Cm8990 estimates that 
about half of the Scottish budget would come from these tax resources, or those which Scotland already 
controlled. 
 
In line with pledges made during the Scottish independence referendum campaign, however, a 
commitment was made to retain the Barnett formula. What would happen after the implementation of 
6PLWKLVWKDWWKHUHZRXOGEHDQDEDWHPHQWWRWKH6FRWWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶VEORFNJUDQWDVFDOFXODWHGE\WKH
Barnett formula, to allow for the tax revenues foregone by Westminster in relation to the various taxes to 
EHGHYROYHGRUK\SRWKHFDWHGWR6FRWODQG,QOLQHZLWKWKHµQR-GHWULPHQW¶SULQFLSOHRI6PLWKWKHLQLWLDOVL]H
of the abatements would be equal to the tax revenues raised by the various taxes at the then current UK 
rates of tax. 
 
It was recognised, however, that the size of the abatements would need to be increased each year by an 
appropriate form of indexation. For income tax, what is proposed in Cm8990 is that indexation should be 
carried out using a method proposed by the Holtham Commission for Wales: (Holtham Commission, 
8QGHUWKLV³+ROWKDP´DSSURDFKWKHDEDWHPHQWIRU LQFRPHWD[ZRXOGEH LQFUHDVHGHDFK\HDU LQ
line with the increase in the overall income tax base for the UK. 
 
At time of writing, the precise details of Holtham indexation have not been specified: but it was 
recognised by Holtham himself that the method could penalise Scotland if the Scottish tax base did not 
grow as fast as that for the UK as a whole. As Professor Holtham himself said, in evidence to the 
6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW)LQDQFH&RPPLWWHHLQ$SULOWKHPHWKRG³PLJKWQRWEHLQ6FRWODQG¶VLQWHUHVWLI
[the Scottish] tax base grows more slowly than that of the UK´6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW)LQDQFH&RPPLWWHH
2013).  
 
No detail is available at present on the proposed indexation methods for the abatements to the Scottish 
block grant for the other devolved taxes: this paper will concentrate solely on the approach currently 
proposed for income tax, (which is, by a good margin, the largest of the taxes to be devolved.) 
 
III Background (2): The effect of relative population change on the Barnett formula 
 
As already noted, a previous paper in this commentary, (Cuthbert, 2001), analysed what the effect would 
be on the Barnett formula if population was growing in England relative to Scotland - as has been the 
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case for many years. This section recapitulates, (without going into any proofs), on the notation and 
formulae established in that paper. 
 
8QGHU WKH %DUQHWW IRUPXOD WKH FKDQJH LQ WKH 6FRWWLVK JRYHUQPHQW¶s Departmental Expenditure Limit 
(DEL) each year is determined as a per capita share of the change in expenditure on corresponding 
services in England. In Cuthbert (2001) a simplified model of Barnett was developed, under which the 
Scottish DEL for any given year is adjusted only once by Barnett, when the new baseline for that year is 
first established. Another simplification is the assumption that public expenditure in England is growing 
by a constant percentage each year. 
 
Specifically, the following notation and assumptions were used:- 
Let E t  denote expenditure in England in year t, and E
S
t  expenditure in Scotland: (strictly, 
³H[SHQGLWXUH´KHUHLVWKDWFRYHUHGLQWKHUHOHYDQW'(/ 
Let p t  denote population in England in year t, and p
S
t  population in Scotland. 
Let R t  denote the ratio of per capita expenditures between Scotland and England at time t. 
Let k denote lag, (in years).  
It was assumed that 
a) E =   Et +1 tT   : (i.e. expenditure in England grows at a constant rate.) 
 
b)  
p
p
 =  
p
p
t+1
t
S
t+1
S
t
O   for all t, where O  1t : (i.e., there is a constant relative rate of 
growth of population in England relative to Scotland). 
 
c) In the annual public expenditure planning round, the new final year baseline is determined as 
being equal to the previous end year figure: and Barnett applies only to that end year, with 
population shares determined at a lag k. 
 
The above model was solved, to show how the per capita spending relativity between Scotland and 
England, denoted by R t , evolves through time from its initial starting value in year 0. 
The relevant formula for R t  is as follows: 
  
 
)-(
1)-(
 +  ]
)-(
1)-(
 [R)( = R kk0
t
t OT
TOOT
TOT
O        , for O T  z  .   (1) 
 
The derivation of formula (1) is given in the Annex to Cuthbert (2001) 
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What formula (1) means is that, in the circumstance where 
O
T   <   1 , then the initial per capita 
spending relativity, R0 ,will decay geometrically to the limiting value  
( -1)
( -
kO TT O)   , which is a 
function of the expenditure growth rate in England, the rate of relative population growth, and the lag. 
 
What this implies is that, when the nominal rate of growth in public expenditure is greater than the 
relative rate of population growth, then the Barnett formula will deliver convergence of the ratio of per 
capita spending levels in Scotland to England towards a limiting value. The significance of formula (1), 
however, is that it indicates that the limiting value will be 1 only if O =1. If !O , then the limiting value 
will be greater than 1: and in the circumstance where T  is not much greater than O , the limiting value 
could be very much greater than 1. For example, a value of  O , (a common historic value), 
and 025.1 T , (together with k = 4), would imply a limiting situation where public expenditure per 
head in Scotland was almost 10% above that in England. 
 
These questions are explored in more detail in Cuthbert, (2001): but formula (1) explains a lot about why 
the Barnett formula has not actually brought about the convergence towards equality in per capita 
spending levels which many commentators were expecting. 
Another important implication of formula (1) is that, if 1  !T
O
, that is, if the rate of growth in nominal 
public expenditure in England falls below the relative rate of population growth in England compared to 
Scotland, then per capita expenditure will increase in Scotland relative to England, and will go on 
increasing. This implication was not studied in detail in the earlier paper, because at that time this 
situation was not expected to occur. But this has been the situation since 2010, given the cutbacks in 
public expenditure following the effects of the 2008 crash. And again, formula (1) explains how the 
Barnett formula, in the presence of relative population change (as between Scotland and England), has 
to some extent protected Scotland from the worst effects of UK public expenditure cuts. 
 
IV Extending the model to include Holtham indexation of a Barnett abatement 
 
In this section, the model outlined in the previous section is extended to cover the situation where there 
is an abatement to the Barnett formula block grant for tax revenues which the Scottish government will 
receive direct: and where this abatement is indexed using the Holtham approach. In developing this 
model, a number of simplifying assumptions are made (in addition to the simplifications in the original 
approach.) In particular, it is assumed that the Scottish government adopts a neutral tax policy, under 
which it does not change its tax rates away from those current in the rest of the UK, (rUK): and it is 
assumed that the ratio of tax receipts to the tax base stays constant through time, in both Scotland and 
the UK as a whole. 
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Additional notation, and further assumptions, are as follows. 
 
Let t
S
t
E
t T and ,T ,T  represent, respectively, tax revenues in England, Scotland and the 
whole UK in year t. 
 
Let I  be the relative rate of growth in the tax base in England as compared to Scotland. It is 
assumed that I  is constant from year to year. In line with the above assumption that tax take is 
proportional to tax base, it follows that 
 
  
S
1-t
S
t
E
1-t
E
t
T
T
T
T I  , for all t. 
 
Let ta represent the abatement to the Barnett formula block grant in year t: then  
S
00 T  a  , 
(given the no-detriment assumption in setting the initial abatement), and 
0
0
t
t a
T
T
  a   , under Holtham indexation, given the assumption that tax take is proportional to 
the tax base. 
 
Let 
S
tE
  represent abated expenditure in Scotland in year t:  
therefore    
S
tt
S
t
S
t T  a- E  E   . 
Finally, let tR

 represent relative per capita spending levels in Scotland and England, when 
Scotland receives the abated block grant, plus its own revenues on devolved taxes. 
 
Then it is shown in Annex 1 that 
   
)-(1)
E
T
)(
p
p
)(
T
a
( - R  R t-t
t
E
t
S
0
0
0
0
tt IO       (2) 
 
where tR is as given in formula (1).  
Note that, if it is assumed that the term )
E
T
(
t
E
t
 remains roughly constant, (that is, if the share of 
³GHYROYHG´ H[SHQGLWXUH LQ (QJODQG IXQGHG E\ ³GHYROYHG´ WD[HV UHPDLQV URXJKO\ FRQVWDQW WKHQ WKH
second term on the right in formula (2) will be of the form  )-(1K
-tt IO  , 
where the constant K in this expression is a fraction, with a value approximately equal to 0.5. This 
IROORZVVLQFH WKH ILUVW WHUP LQEUDFNHWV LQHTXDWLRQ  LV 6FRWODQG¶V LQLWLDO VKDUHRI8. WD[HV DQG WKH
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second term is the ratio of English to Scottish population, so the product of these two terms will be 
approximately 1. The third term is the share of expenditure in England, (on the same services as are 
devolved in Scotland), which is funded by taxes which are devolved in Scotland: the corresponding 
figure is approximately 0.5 in Scotland, and the English figure is likely to be broadly similar. 
        
So, roughly speaking,  
 
 )-(1K - R  R
-tt
tt IO   , where K is approximately equal to 0.5.  (3) 
 
In deriving the approximate expression in formula (3), a number of further assumptions are clearly being 
made: for example, it involves sweeping up all forms of taxation into a composite aggregate: it involves 
assuming that the abatements for the non-income tax element of the aggregate are indexed by 
something like Holtham indexation: and it involves assuming that the relative growth rates for the 
different tax bases, (the I values for each element), are the same. Nevertheless, while bearing these 
assumptions in mind, the approximation in formula (3) is a useful guide as to how the dynamics of the 
post-Smith system are likely to evolve.  
 
V Implications 
 
So what are the implications of the above analysis? 
 
i) When tax bases grow at the same rate, the Barnett formula works as at present: An 
immediate implication of formula (3) is that, if I  = 1, (that is, when the tax base in Scotland is 
growing at the same rate as that for the UK as a whole), then the last term is equal to zero, and 
hence the evolution of relative per capita spend would be exactly as under the original Barnett 
formula. This is as expected; Holtham indexation is neutral when the tax bases grow at the 
same rate. 
 
ii) But things are very different if the tax bases do not grow at the same rate. If tO , (that 
is, if population is growing relatively faster in England as compared with Scotland, as has been 
the case for many years), and if 1zI , (that is, if the tax bases are not growing at the same 
rate), then the formulae imply that relative per capita spend will eventually move to values 
which are, under any criterion, untenable. In the most stable case, when 1   O  and 1  !I , 
formula (3) implies that, for large t,  R t

will behave asymptotically as K - R t : which would 
imply, if the unadjusted Barnett formula was leading to long term convergence of per capita 
spending levels to something like parity, that public expenditure per head in Scotland would 
converge to something like 50% of the value in England.  
In the less stable case, where 1  !O , then the final term in formula (3) diverges ± upwards if 
1  I , and downwards if 1  !I . 
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iii) And increases in relative population change magnify the effects. Finally, it is worth noting 
that, because of the 
tO  component in the final term of equation (3), any increase in O , (that 
is, the rate of relative population change in England compared to Scotland),  magnifies the 
effect of Holtham indexation. 
 
VI Potential Dynamic Effects 
 
What the previous section means is that, (other than in the unlikely case where 1   I ), the system is 
such that it cannot proceed indefinitely with constant values of IOT  and  , : eventually, relative values 
of per capita spend in Scotland as compared to England would move to values which would be politically 
unacceptable, and something would have to change.  
 
Such a change might come about as a result of policy action: either by the Westminster government, 
(e.g. in the form of a fiscal transfer): or through specific policy action by the Scottish government. There 
is more discussion of this possibility later. But left to itself, it appears likely that the way the parameters 
in the system will evolve will be destabilising, rather than stabilising.  
 
To illustrate this kind of possibility, consider the following hypothetical scenario. Suppose that, due to a 
boom in financial services in the City, there was an increase in English tax receipts, and that the 
Westminster government responded to this by increasing the rate of planned public expenditure growth. 
The implication, in terms of the model, is that the parameter  T , (the rate of growth of public 
expenditure in England), and I  , (the relative rate of growth in the tax base), would both increase at 
some specific time. Looking at formula (3), the effect of the increase in  T will be to reduce the limiting 
value to which the unadjusted Barnett formula is converging, (i.e. the term 
)-(
1)-(
 k OT
TO ): to increase the 
rate of convergence to that value, (as the term T
O
 becomes smaller), and to increase the amount 
subtracted off in the final term of formula (3), (since )-(1K
-tt IO  is an increasing function of I ). In 
other words, the increases in IT  and  will both have the effect of reducing  R t , (that is, relative per 
capita spend in Scotland as compared to England). 
 
But the effects are unlikely to simply end there: the decline in  R t

is likely to have a depressing effect 
on the Scottish economy: and that, together with the initial stimulus to the economy in London and the 
South East, is likely to contribute in turn to an increase in the relative population growth parameter, O . 
The effect of an increase in O works in different directions in the different components of formula (3): in 
the Barnett element, it will increase the limiting value, and slow the rate of convergence: but the 
tO  term 
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 38(3) Economic perspectives 
June 2015 8 
will magnify the Holtham reduction element. For reasonable values of the parameters, the latter effect 
will dominate, however. So the overall effect of increasing O  will be to further reduce  R t . 
 
The danger is that the effect of reducing relative per capita spend in Scotland,  R t

, will be to further 
depress the Scottish economy, with further knock on effects on the relative growth rates of the tax base 
and of population. In other words, the adverse effects of the long term behaviour of  R t

with fixed 
parameter values, which as has already been noted are untenable, (unless 1   I ), are likely to be 
accentuated by further dynamic effects on the parameters. 
 
Of course, for a mechanism of this type to take effect, it would have to be the case that changes in the 
model parameters, of the order of magnitude that might reasonably be expected in the real world, would 
have material effects on  R t

. Figure 1 below illustrates that modest changes in parameter values can 
indeed have material effects. The figure considers two scenarios. Under Scenario 1, the values of the 
parameters are T  = 1.05, O = 1.0028, and I  = 1.005: and under Scenario 2, T  = 1.06, O = 1.004, 
and I  = 1.008 . What figure 1 shows is how the ratio of relative per capita spend in Scotland to England 
would evolve from an initial value of 1.14, first of all under the pure Barnett formula, (with values of T  
and O as in Scenario 1): then under Holtham indexation, with Scenario 1 parameters: and finally under 
Holtham indexation and Scenario 2 parameters. The figure illustrates how the fairly modest changes in 
parameter values between the two scenarios do indeed have a quite marked effect on the rate of decline 
of  R t

. (The figure also illustrates how, for the scenario 1 parameter values, Holtham indexation is 
indeed much less favourable for Scotland than the original pure Barnett formula.) 
 
 
 
Figure 1: S/E per capita expenditure ratio, under Barnett, and two scenarios with Holtham
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The overall implication is that, without active policy intervention, the system currently being set up is 
likely to be unstable. Which then raises the question: are the available policy levers such that the system 
can be adequately controlled? 
 
At this point the argument becomes more speculative. But as regards the policy levers wielded by the 
Scottish government, it appears unlikely that they would be sufficient to counter the kind of adverse 
dynamics outlined above. The economic powers which the Scottish government will possess after the 
implementation of Smith will themselves be fairly limited. The Scottish government is likely to have little 
scope to counter a decline in  R t

 by raising tax rates ± because if tax rates get badly out of line with 
rUK, that in itself will depress the Scottish economy, giving a further adverse push to   and OI . And in 
a situation where  R t

is already declining, the scope for boosting the economy by radically cutting tax 
rates will be limited. 
 
Overall, the conclusion is that the system is unlikely to be stable unless Westminster is prepared to 
actively deploy the other potential type of policy measure ± namely, adjustments to overall fiscal 
transfers. 
 
The above discussion illustrates the possibility of Scotland becoming locked into a cycle where relative 
expenditure per head, compared to England, is aggressively reduced, much faster than would happen 
under the Barnett formula: and where, unlike the Barnett formula, these reductions would not stop once 
parity was reached. However, in the long run, the chances of a converse cycle, where  R t

 
progressively increases, seem unlikely. This is because, assuming that there is long run economic 
normalisation of the UK economy, and that nominal public expenditure maintains a roughly constant 
share of nominal GDP, then relatively high trend values of UK nominal public expenditure growth could 
be expected, which would imply a high value of T . If the Scottish economy did start to boom, then this is 
likely to depress the relative population growth parameter, O . The combination of a high T  and low O
would imply that the unadjusted Barnett formula would have an tR value which would converge 
downwards fairly rapidly towards 1. Against the background of a declining Barnett term, tR  in formula 
(3), the chances of an unstable upswing in relative per capita spend,  R t

, look remote. 
 
VII A suggested adjustment to Holtham indexation. 
 
Under Holtham indexation as currently proposed, neutrality will occur if the tax base in Scotland grows at 
the same rate as the tax base in the UK as a whole. If the UK population is growing relative to that in 
Scotland, then for this condition to be satisfied, it must hold that the tax base per head in Scotland must 
grow at the same rate as the tax base per head in the UK, multiplied by the relative rate of population 
growth in the UK as a whole compared to Scotland. This implies that, for Holtham indexation to be 
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neutral, Scotland must grow its tax base per head at a faster rate than the per capita tax base in the UK 
as a whole. 
 
An alternative criterion for neutrality would be that the system should be neutral if the per capita tax 
bases in Scotland and the UK were growing at the same rate. To achieve an indexation system which 
satisfied this neutrality condition, what would be required would be to use an indexation factor which was 
equal to the growth in the UK tax base over the relevant period, divided by the relative growth in the UK 
to Scottish populations over the period.  
 
There is a good argument in terms of equity for making this adjustment to Holtham indexation. In 
addition, making the change has the effect of somewhat dampening the instability that is a danger with 
an unadjusted Holtham indexation. Without going into the detail of the algebra, it can be shown that the 
effect of the adjustment is to replace formula (2) above by an expression for  R t

which can be 
approximated by 
 
 ))(-(1)
E
T
)(
p
p
)(
T
a
( - R  R t
t
E
t
S
0
0
E
0
0
tt I
O       (4) 
 
The expression in formula (4) will converge if  1 !! OI  , (assuming )  OT ! , whereas unadjusted 
Holtham indexation would diverge in these circumstances. 
 
The adjusted system is still not satisfactory: the limit of equation (4) would still, in the long run, represent 
an untenable ratio of per capita expenditure. But the behaviour of the system will be much more 
damped: so the potential for adverse dynamic effects is reduced. 
 
As an illustration of the effect of the adjustment to Holtham indexation, Figure 2 shows exactly the same 
scenarios as Figure 1, but now with adjusted Holtham indexation. It can be seen that the adjustment has 
had the effect of significantly reducing the departure from the original Barnett formula: and of reducing 
the effect of moving from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2. 
 
There are therefore technical, as well as equity, arguments for making the suggested adjustment to 
Holtham indexation: although, as has been seen, the long run position even with the adjustment is still 
likely to be untenable. 
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VIII Conclusion 
 
This paper has modelled the way in which the revenues received by the Scottish government will 
behave, under the type of arrangement currently proposed for the implementation of the Smith 
Commission reforms as set out in Cm8990: specifically, what is considered is the kind of arrangement 
being proposed for income tax, under which there will be an abatement to the Barnett formula block 
grant in relation to the tax revenues foregone by Westminster, and this abatement will then be indexed 
by what is known as the Holtham approach.  
 
 A number of simplifying assumptions have been made: e.g. that the Scottish government adopts a 
neutral tax policy: and that tax revenues maintain a constant proportion of the tax base, in both Scotland 
and the UK. Nevertheless, despite the magnitude of these simplifying assumptions, the results of the 
modelling are of considerable interest, since they illustrate the underlying pressures which are likely to 
shape the dynamics of the system. 
 
There are three key parameters in the system: the rate of growth of public expenditure in England, (T ): 
the relative rate of growth of population in England compared to Scotland, ( O ): and the relative rate of 
growth of the tax base in England compared to Scotland, (I ). 
 
What the model shows is that, other than the unlikely case when I  = 1, then for fixed values of 
IOT  and  , , the system will evolve towards a position where relative per capita spending levels in 
Scotland and England are so different that the situation is politically untenable. What this implies is that 
the system cannot run on indefinitely for fixed values of IOT  and  , : something would have to change. 
Figure 2: S/E per capita expenditureratio: under Barnett, and two scenarios with adjusted Holtham
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In fact, the situation is worse than this, because, as the paper explains, there are likely to be dynamic 
feedback effects on IOT  and  ,  which will make the system more unstable. 
 
The implication is that, to maintain the operation of the fiscal system in some reasonable form of stability, 
active policy intervention will be required, by the Scottish government, by Westminster, or by both. The 
policy levers available to the Scottish government are so limited that it is unlikely to be able to maintain 
stability on its own. (It is worth remembering that the Scottish government will have control of only a 
single major tax, income tax: that it will have restricted borrowing powers: and that it lacks control of 
competition policy, international trade development, licensing of North Sea oil, utility regulation, and a 
number of labour market responsibilities.) This implies that an active monitoring of the system by 
Westminster, and adjustment of fiscal transfers, are likely to be required. 
 
The paper also proposes an adjustment to crude Holtham indexation which, while by no means 
providing a complete answer to the likely problems, has strong equity arguments in its favour, and would 
also have a stabilising effect on the system. 
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Annex 1: Proof of formula (2) 
 
The notation is as in the main part of the paper. The proof proceeds in a number of steps. 
 
1) Express 
S
tT in terms of 
E
tT . 
Since, by definition, 
S
1-t
S
t
E
1-t
E
t
T
T
T
T I  , for all t, it follows that  
 
E
0
S
0t-
E
1-t
S
1-t1-
E
t
S
t
T
T
 ....  
T
T
  
T
T II     : 
 
therefore  
E
tE
0
0t-S
t T
T
a
  T I , since 0S0 a  T  . 
 
2) Calculate the Holtham indexation factor. 
 )
T
a
(1T  T T  T
E
0
0t-E
t
S
t
E
tt I  : 
 
therefore,  indexation factor =  )
T
a
(1
T
T
    
T
T
E
0
0t
0
E
t
0
t  I  . 
 
3) Calculate adjustment to Barnett block grant. 
 
Adjustment to Barnett block grant 
 = - (indexed abatement) + (Scottish tax revenues) 
 = 
0E
0
0t
0
E
t a)
T
a
(1
T
T
  - I  +  EtE
0
0t- T
T
a
 I  
 = ]
T
T
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a
1)[
T
a
(T-
E
0
0t-
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0
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t II  
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a
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E
0
E
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0
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 II  
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S
t
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t I  . 
 
 
4) Calculate  R t

. 
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      R t

 = 
t
t
S
t
S
t
E
p
 
p
E
 
  = )
p
p
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E
T
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T
a
( -R
S
t
tt-
t
E
t
0
0
t I  
  = ] - 1[)
E
T
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p
p
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T
a
( -R t-t
t
E
t
S
0
0
0
0
t IO  ,  since  )
p
p
(  
p
p
S
0
0t
S
t
t O : 
 
thus establishing formula (2). 
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